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GROUP SELECTION WITH IMPERFECT SEPARATION – 
AN EXPERIMENT 
 







We experimentally investigate the effect of imperfect separation of groups on 
group selection and cooperation in a standard prisoner’s dilemma environment. 
Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them an 
institutionalized norm fosters cooperation. The degree of separation of the two groups is 
varied between treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into 
the group where the norm is implemented and the share of participants that cooperate, 
rise monotonously with the degree of group separation. Furthermore with higher group 
separation significantly more subjects support the enforcement of the norm. 
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One of the biggest challenges in social sciences, as well as in biology is to explain
pro-social behavior in social dilemma situations. The paradigmatic model of such a
situation is the prisoner’s dilemma game. In this game agents can choose between
a cooperative action and a defective action. Defection is a dominant strategy for
both players (thus individually rational), but both would be better oﬀ if they jointly
cooperated. People are often observed to cooperate in such situations although they
could achieve a higher payoﬀ choosing defection, independently of what their opponent
does. This phenomenon has been termed the puzzle of pro-sociality.
Cultural Group Selection is an often advanced explanation for the survival of
pro-sociality in social dilemma situations. The basic idea is that if there are two
separated cultural groups, one in which agents cooperate (because they share a norm
or are genetically programmed to do so) and one, in which agents defect, the agents
in the cooperative group will earn higher payoﬀs and thus have higher evolutionary
ﬁtness. This will lead to a proliferation of the cooperative trait or norm.1 Typically
though cultural groups are not perfectly separated, i.e. there is always a positive
probability that agents interact with someone from another group. However, as long as
agents of the cooperative group are matched with a suﬃciently high probability among
themselves cooperation can still survive. The intuition simply is that if cooperators
interact relatively often with other cooperators they will receive the high payoﬀ of joint
cooperation a lot of times, whereas defectors will get the low payoﬀ of joint defection
a lot of times. Populations in which there is an increased probability of interacting
with agents of one’s own type (cultural group) are called viscous populations.2
This experiment is the ﬁrst in a series of experiments designed to study the eﬀect
of population viscosity on group selection, norm-adherence and cooperation. Our ﬁrst
set of research questions - that we investigate in this experiment - are the following:
• Can institutionalized norms induce cooperation, i.e. do people react rationally
to such an institution ?
• Can norms shared by a group of agents survive in viscous populations where
norm-adherers are not fully protected from exploitation ?
• Can the success of a norm in sustaining cooperation aﬀect normative beliefs and
how does the answer to this question depend on population viscosity ?
These are very important questions for economists. If agents do not react optimally
to institutions, implementing them can have undesired eﬀects. But even if the ﬁrst
question has the desired answer for the economist - i.e. if agents do react optimally
to the institutionalized norm - we still have to know whether this continues to be so
1See Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000), Boyd and Richerson (2005), Richerson, Boyd and Henrich
(2003) or Wilson and Sober (1994) among others.
2See Myerson, Pollock and Swinkels (1991) or Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000) among others.when they sometimes can be exploited by others that do not adhere to the norm.
Finally the survival of institutionalized norms in the long-run will depend on whether
these institutions manage to inﬂuence normative beliefs in a way that supports them.3
In the experiment subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in
one of them an institutionalized norm fosters cooperation. The degree of separation
of the two groups, i.e. the extent to which matching is biased towards ”within group”
interactions, is varied between treatments. We ﬁnd that participants choose into the
”norm governed” group if and only if the degree of separation between groups is high
enough. Also while agents in the norm governed group cooperate if and only if the
degree of separation is high enough, agents in the other group almost never cooperate.
Finally both, the share of participants that choose into the norm governed group and
the share of participants that cooperate, rise monotonously with the degree of popu-
lation viscosity (the degree of separation between groups). Population viscosity seems
a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation. Our ﬁrst two questions have positive
answers. Participants react rationally to the institutionalized norm and the norm
survives whenever norm-adherers are suﬃciently well protected from exploitation.
We then tackle our third and maybe most diﬃcult question and try to elicit nor-
mative beliefs and attitudes towards norm enforcement. To these ends we gave par-
ticipants a questionnaire specially designed to elicit their cooperative types, attitudes
towards norm enforcement and normative beliefs at the end of the experiment.4 While
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between cooperator types among treatments, we ﬁnd
that in treatments with high separation (where the norm succeeds in inducing cooper-
ative equilibria) signiﬁcantly more subjects claim to be in favor of norm enforcement.5
There seem to be feedback eﬀects between the equilibria of the diﬀerent treatments
and attitudes towards norm enforcement.6 High viscosity seems to favor norm en-
forcement.
The experimental literature has already demonstrated the existence of diﬀerent
cooperative types. Fischbacher, Fehr and G¨ achter (2001) ﬁnd that in their experiment
roughly 50% of all subjects can be classiﬁed as conditional cooperators, 30% are ﬂat
defectors and only very few cooperate always.7 Their two principal types (conditional
cooperators and defectors) are also the main types we ﬁnd in our questionnaire.
Only very recently experimental economics has started to focus on the relation
between interaction structures and cooperation. Coricelli, Fehr and Fellner (2004) or
3In our second experiment (Grimm and Mengel (2007)) we then remove the instution and inves-
tigate whether a norm for cooperation can arise endogenously.
4We are aware of the problems of using questionnaire data. We see it as a useful method and as
a very ﬁrst step to tackle the diﬃcult question of measuring social norms in experiments without
distorting the participants decisions. See also the discussion in Section 6.
5Note that these results jointly imply that the participants’ answers in the questionnaire were not
mainly driven by dissonance avoidance.
6If such feedback eﬀects do indeed exist many interesting theoretical predictions arise (See Ben-
abou and Tirole (2005), Mengel (2006), Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) or Traxler (2005)).
See also the discussion in section 6.
7See also Fischbacher and G¨ achter (2006) or Brandts and Schram (2001).
3Page, Putterman and Unel (2005) are examples of studies in which agents can endoge-
nously choose interaction partners.8 Grimm and Mengel (2007) examine cooperation
in viscous populations without institutionalized norms.
The eﬀect of punishment institutions has been investigated by Kosfeld and Riedl
(2004) among others. Guererk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2006) show that subjects
learn to choose into a group where a punishment mechanism is at place.9 Our results
in the full separation treatment conﬁrm theirs.
Except for Grimm and Mengel (2007) all the above studies deal only with the
case of perfect separation of groups. To our knowledge our studies are the ﬁrst to
analyze the case of imperfect separation. Another novelty in our experiment is the
questionnaire that allows us to gain knowledge about variables such as attitudes to-
wards normative criteria and norm enforcement and their relation to behavior in the
experiment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical model
underlying our study. In Section 3 the hypotheses derived from this model are sum-
marized and Section 4 describes the experimental design. The results from the ex-
periment are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to a more
general discussion of norms in experiments and points to some promising directions
for future research. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Basic Game
The game we study is a standard (symmetric) Prisoner’s dilemma game, in which





Table 1: Payoﬀ Matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
with c > a > d > b. The cooperative outcome is eﬃcient whenever a > b+c
2 . In the
experiment we use the following parametrization
a = 400;b = 50;c = 550;d = 200. (1)
If agents are randomly matched to play this game the unique prediction is mutual
defection and thus a payoﬀ of d (= 200) for both. What happens if there is a cultural
8See also Ones and Putterman (2006) or the literature on network experiments reviewed in Falk
and Kosfeld (2003).
9See also Goette, Huﬀman and Meier (2006) for a ﬁeld study on these issues.
4group that shares a norm to cooperate (play C) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma? Clearly if
agents in this group would exclusively interact among themselves they would receive
a payoﬀ of a (= 400) and would be better oﬀ than agents that do not adhere to the
norm. These latter agents interacting only among themselves would receive a payoﬀ
of d (= 200). Group Selection argues that in this case the norm would slowly spread
and ﬁnally take over the population. The reason is that as agents adhering to the
norm receive higher payoﬀs, they have higher evolutionary ﬁtness and will be selected
according to many standard evolutionary dynamics.10 Whenever cultural groups are
not perfectly isolated though, defectors can sometimes exploit norm-adherers. Our
model is designed to study group selection and cooperation in the case where cultural
groups are not perfectly separated.11
2.2 Cultural Groups
There are two cultural groups: A and B. Agents in group A share a norm to cooperate.
This norm is institutionalized in group A through a punishment institution. More
precisely, whenever a member of group A defects in an interaction with another A
member she incurs a payoﬀ loss of γ (= 200). One can think of this as a social
disapproval mechanism. While in the experiment punishment is material, in real
life this term will typically correspond to either a psychological payoﬀ loss or to
anticipation of a material loss in the future.12 Thus, whereas a member of group B
faces the payoﬀ matrix given in table 1, the relevant payoﬀ matrix for a group A
member is given by
C D
C a b
D c − γδAA d − γδAA
Table 2: Payoﬀ Matrix Group A
where δAA takes on the value δAA = 1 if both interaction partners are group A
members. Obviously, for a group B member δAA = 0 independently of whom he
interacts with.
In our model, group-membership deﬁnes an agent’s type. At all times agents have
incomplete information about the type of their match. When choosing an action in
the bilateral game they have to estimate the type of their match from the distribution
of types in the economy and from their knowledge about the matching technology
described below. Clearly, for a group B member defection is a dominant strategy.
10See Boyd and Richerson (2005), Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000) or Wilson and Sober (1994) among
others.
11Our baseline model of group selection in viscous populations builds on Mengel’s (2006) model
of cultural transmission of social norms.
12See Section 6 for further discussion of this issue.
5For a group A member, whether cooperation or defection is optimal depends on the
relative size of the two groups and on the degree of separation of the two groups or
the matching technology.
A B
A 1 − pBx pBx
B pAx 1 − pAx
Table 3: Matching Probabilities
Matching takes place randomly in a viscous population, the latter meaning that
individuals have a tendency to interact more often with individuals that are of the
same type. The degree of viscosity is measured by the parameter x ∈ [0,1]. x = 1
corresponds to the case of random matching. x = 0 means that the population is
fully viscous, implying that agents interact with probability 1 with agents of the same
group and never with agents from another group. This is the case typically considered
in models of group selection. In a viscous society with parameter x, if pA is the share
of agents of type A (members of group A) the probability for any one of them to
interact with a B type is (1 − pA)x = pBx and the probability to interact with a
member of group A is (1 − (1 − pA)x) = 1 − pBx. Obviously if the society is fully
viscous (x = 0), agents only interact with agents of their own cultural group. In
other words, in this case cultural groups are separated. The matching probabilities
are summarized in table 3.
2.3 Cultural Equilibria
We assume that materially successful groups attract agents and proliferate. Denote
pA the share of agents in group A and assume that pA evolves as follows:
·
pA = pA(1 − pA)[ΠA − ΠB], (2)
where ΠA and ΠB are the average payoﬀs of group A and group B members.
Remark 1 Equation (2) is essentially the well known replicator dynamics used in
biology and evolutionary game theory.13 It can follow for example from a process in
which expected payoﬀ maximizing agents can decide periodically to change their group
and adopt the corresponding payoﬀ matrix. Alternatively one could think of agents as
being reinforcement learners, that are endowed with attractions for the two groups. A
”good” payoﬀ experience in any group reinforces the agents attraction for that group.
Such a process can also be approximated by (2). Both are possible models of how group
13For good introductions to concepts from evolutionary game theory see Weibull (1995) or Vega-
Redondo (1996).
6choice operates in our experiment.14 While the ﬁrst one presumes a rather high degree
of rationality of the agents, in the reinforcement model agents hardly need to know
anything about the game played. In particular, they do not need to understand the
incentive structure, nor calculate best response functions, nor they need to know that
there is strategic interaction.
Let us call a cultural equilibrium a share pA together with an action choice in
the bilateral game, such that (i) the action choice is a Nash equilibrium given x and
pA and (ii) pA is an asymptotically stable equilibrium of (2). Then, the theoretical
prediction can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1
(i) If x < 1
4 the globally stable cultural equilibrium has p∗
A = 1 with all players cooper-
ating.
(ii) If x ∈ [1
4, 4
7] there are two locally stable cultural equilibria: p∗
A = 1 with all players
cooperating and p∗
A = 0 with all players defecting.
(iii) If x > 4
7 the globally stable cultural equilibrium has p∗
A = 0 with all players defect-
ing.15
Proof Appendix A. ￿
In the experiment we implemented four treatments corresponding to the viscosity
parameters x = 0, 1
3, 2
3,1. The theoretical predictions for these treatments are sum-
marized in the following section.
3 Hypotheses from the Theory
Group Selection In treatments x = 0 and x =
1
3 all subjects should join group A
and cooperate. In treatments x = 2
3 and x = 1 all subjects should join group B and
defect.
Cooperation Group B members should always defect. Whether cooperation or
defection is optimal for group A members depends on (i) the relative size of the two
groups, pA, and on (ii) the degree of separation of the two groups, x. An equilibrium
where subjects in group A cooperate exists if and only if viscosity is suﬃciently high
(i.e. in treatments x = 0 and x =
1
3).
14Equation (2) could also be derived from models of payoﬀ-biased imitation and cultural transmis-
sion of social norms, see Mengel (2006). Deriving the dynamics from such a model would lead to the
following equation:
·
pA = pA(1−pA)x[ΠA −ΠB], where the viscosity factor x represents a change of
time scale. If there is little interaction between groups (small x) cultural transmission is slow.
15Note that whereas in the theory outlined above there is a continuum of agents this is obviously
not the case in the experiment. Proposition 1 is derived for the discrete case of our experiment.
7Proﬁts Average proﬁts in the population should be equal to 400 in treatments x = 0
and x = 1
3 and equal to 200 in treatments x = 2
3 and x = 1. Group A members should




3 and x = 1).16
Rate of Convergence and Learning Dynamics Both approaches (the evolu-
tionary model and the reinforcement learning model) predict that learning is fastest
for x = 0, slower for x = 1 and slowest for the intermediate x–values.
Agents are expected to switch from group A to group B after observing a high
share pA or a high rate of defection in treatments x = 2
3 and x = 1. Experiencing
punishment can also induce switching into group B.
Agents are expected to switch from group B to group A after observing a high
share pA or a high rate of defection in treatments x = 0 and x = 1
3.
4 The Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted in four sessions in May, 2006. A total of 128 students
(32 per session) were recruited among the student population of the University of
Cologne — mainly undergraduate students with no (or very little) prior exposure to
game theory.
In order to answer our research questions we implemented four diﬀerent treatments
that diﬀered in the degree of viscosity, x, as deﬁned in section 2. We chose the values
x ∈ {0, 1
3, 2
3,1}. One population consisted of 8 subjects. The members of a population
were initially randomly assigned to groups A and B in equal proportions and played
a Prisoner’s dilemma for 100 rounds. In the ﬁrst four rounds, each subject played the
game described in section 2 with an interaction partner who was assigned randomly
according to the matching technology. From round 5 on, each round had two stages.
At the ﬁrst stage, two of the eight subjects could decide to either join the other group,
or to stay in their own group. Each subject could make this decision every fourth
round. At the second stage of each round, subjects played the (modiﬁed) prisoner’s
dilemma game as given by (2) with an interaction partner who was assigned randomly
according to the matching technology. Prior to playing the game they were informed
about (a) the percentage of subjects in group A and B, and (b) their individual
probability to meet a group–A and group–B member, respectively.
Since in our experiment the population was necessarily ﬁnite, one-to-one match-
ing was not feasible for matching technologies with x  = 1 (i.e. in three out of four
treatments). Instead, we ﬁrst realized a random draw with the probabilities given
in table 3 to decide whether a subject’s interaction partner was from group A or B.
Then the interaction partner played the actions ”cooperate” or ”defect” with prob-
abilities that corresponded to the proportions with which those actions were played
16If this were not the case, an equilibrium where agents select into group A (B) in treatments
x = 0 and x = 1
3 (x = 2
3 and x = 1) could not be stable under (2).
8in the respective group (in that round). Of course the general matching procedure
we used was the same for all treatments. In the unlikely event that only one subject
remained in a group (either A or B) and the ﬁrst random draw determined that he
had to play against an member of his own group, the subject’s interaction partner
was preprogrammed to play the equilibrium strategy.17 After each of the 100 rounds,
subjects were informed of whether their interaction partner belonged to group A or
B, his action, and their own monetary payoﬀs.
At the end of the experiment (after all 100 rounds were ﬁnished) we had the par-
ticipants answer a questionnaire designed to elicit their attitudes towards cooperation,
the normative principles their decisions were guided by, and their attitudes towards
norm enforcement.
The four experimental sessions were computerized.18 Written instructions were
distributed at the beginning of the experiment.19 Each session took approximately
120 minutes (including reading the instructions, answering a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire and receiving payments). Subjects participating in the experiment received
2.50 Euros just to show up. On average subjects earned Euro 15.25 Euros (all in-
cluded).
5 Results
5.1 Prologue: Attitudes Towards Cooperation
Let us ﬁrst report some results from the post–experimental questionnaire that we will
later on refer to in our analysis of the data.
Cooperator Types In the post–experimental questionnaire we asked the subjects
whether — in a one shot game — they would cooperate if 0 (25, 50, 75, 100) per
cent of the other subjects cooperated. From the answers we identify four ”cooperator
types”: (1) ﬂat defectors (who always defect), (2) altruists (who always cooperate),
(3) conditional cooperators (who cooperate if and only if the share of cooperators is
suﬃciently high) and (4) hump shaped (who cooperate if and only if the share of
cooperators is intermediate and defect otherwise). Table 4 reports the results. The
attitude of subjects towards cooperation seems to vary somewhat across treatments
but the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant.20
17The subjects were informed that the interaction partner would play optimally given the situation
in this case.
18The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999).
19The instructions for x = 0, translated into English, can be found in the Appendix. Instructions
for the remaining treatments are available upon request.
20We ran logit regressions on the questionnaire data for the following binary variables: defector =
1 if an agent is classiﬁed as defector and zero otherwise, cooperator = 1 if an agent is classiﬁed as
either altruist (altruist) or conditional cooperator (conditionalC) and humpshaped = 1 if an agent
is classiﬁed as hump-shaped. Estimating the coeﬃcients of treatment dummies gives no signiﬁcant
eﬀects.
9Treatment
Cooperator Type x = 0 x = 1
3 x = 2
3 x = 1 Overall
ﬂat defectors .19 .41 .41 .28 .32
altruists .06 – – .03 .02
conditional cooperators .28 .37 .28 .34 .32
hump shaped .31 .19 .22 .19 .23
none of the others .16 .03 .09 .16 .11
Table 4: Cooperator Types.
Norm Enforcement A second observation from the questionnaire that we would
like to report are the subjects’ attitudes towards norm enforcement. We asked subjects
the question whether they think that choosing defection in the stage game should be
punished. In treatments with a high degree of group separation (x = 0 and x = 1
3),
the majority of subjects was in favor of punishment, while in those treatments where
group separation was low (x =
2
3 and x = 1), the majority was against punishment
of defectors (using random matching as a benchmark the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at
the 5% (1%) level for x = 0 (x = 1
3)). Those answers approximately reﬂect what the
subjects experienced in the experiment. As we have shown in section 2 punishment as
implemented in our design induces cooperation for a high degree of group separation
whereas it fails to do so for a low degree of separation between groups. Also in
the experiment cooperation obtained for x = 0 and x = 1
3 and defection was the
predominant pattern for x = 2
3 and x = 1.
Treatment
Norm Enforcer? x = 0 x = 1
3 x = 2
3 x = 1 Overall
no .44 .34 .53 .69 .50
yes .56 .66 .47 .31 .50
Table 5: Attitudes Towards Norm Enforcement.
We conclude that there seem to be feedback eﬀects from the treatment variable
(x) to the subjects attitudes towards norm enforcement. Furthermore we ﬁnd that
participants that claim to be conditional cooperators in the questionnaire are in favor
of norm enforcement signiﬁcantly (at the 1% level) more often in all treatments.21
We will come back to the questionnaire results in section 6. Now let us turn to
the analysis of our experimental data. We proceed as follows: We ﬁrst report the
21We regress the variable dpunish (= 1 if the answer is yes and zero if no) on treatment variables
and cooperator types (as well as interaction terms) using logit regressions.
10evidence on group choice. Then, we show the eﬀects group choice had on cooperation
rates in the two groups (A and B), overall cooperation rates and proﬁts (again, per
group and overall) in the population. Finally we report some evidence on the speed
of convergence and on learning dynamics.
5.2 Group Choice
Figure 1 impressively illustrates the eﬀect population viscosity has on group choice.
While in the perfectly separated population (treatment x = 0) almost all subjects join
group A, the share of subjects that are in group A decreases as viscosity decreases.
However, even under random matching, group A does not entirely disappear.22
Figure 1: The Share of Subjects in Group A (per treatment).
Statistical analysis yields the following results, which are all signiﬁcant at the 1%
level:23
Result 1 (Group Choice)
(i) The share of subjects in group A is higher, the more viscous the population is.
22This can in part be explained by the incentives of our experimental design. In treatment x = 0,
since a single group B member was automatically matched with a preprogrammed defector, there
was a strict incentive to join group A in order to realize the gains from mutual cooperation. In
treatment x = 1, however, if all other subjects were in group B, a subject had the same expected
payoﬀ from a given action if it remained in group A (since under random matching it could not meet
another group A member and therefore, punishment was impossible).
23We ran random eﬀect logit regressions for the variable groupA (= 1 if an agent is in group A
and zero otherwise). The independent variables were cooperator, dpunish, the treatment dummies
and interaction terms.
11(ii) ”Conditional cooperators” are more likely to be in group A in treatments x = 0
and x = 1
3 and more likely to be in group B in treatments x = 2
3 and x = 1.
(iii) ”Norm enforcers” are more likely to be in group A in treatments x = 0 and x = 1
3.
These results have very intuitive interpretations. Conditional Cooperators coop-
erate whenever matched with high probability with other cooperators. Consequently
in treatments x = 0 and x = 1
3 they cooperate and choose group A, whereas in treat-
ments x =
2
3 and x = 1 they defect as the environment is characterized by defection,
but then it is optimal to join group B. It also makes perfect sense that norm enforcers
choose into the group (A) where the norm is enforced. On the other hand experiencing
”successful” norm enforcement in treatments x = 0 and x = 1
3 (where most subjects
are in group A) possibly leads agents to regard norm enforcement a sensible thing to
do. These are the feedback eﬀects already mentioned in the previous section.24
5.3 Cooperation
As ﬁgure 2 illustrates, the shares of cooperating subjects in the population evolves in
line with the share of subjects in group A (compare ﬁgure 1). Analyzing cooperation
shares separately for the two diﬀerent groups reveals that in all treatments (except
x = 1) the majority of subjects in group A cooperates, while almost no group B–
member does (see table 4).
Figure 2: Shares of Cooperators.
24Whereas in the case of conditional cooperation the treatment dummies can be used to control
for endogeneity, in the case of norm-enforcement this cannot be done, as norm-enforcement is highly
correlated with treatment. In this case there are true feedback eﬀects.
12Treatment Group Overall
A B
x = 0 .95 .14 .94
x = 1
3 .90 .06 .86
x = 2
3 .70 .02 .66
x = 1 .42 .08 .29
Table 6: Average Cooperation Rates
We obtain the following results which are again all signiﬁcant at the 1% level:25
Result 2 (Cooperation)
(i) Subjects in group A cooperate signiﬁcantly more than subjects in group B.
(ii) The more subjects are in group A the more subjects cooperate in group A (except
treatment x = 0, where subjects almost always cooperate in group A).
(iii) ”Norm Enforcers” are more likely to cooperate in all treatments.
(iv) ”Conditional Cooperators” and ”Altruists” cooperate signiﬁcantly more than all
other cooperator types in all treatments.
Again the interpretation of the results seems clear. (i) and (ii) simply reﬂect
the incentive structure. Defection makes only sense in group B as in group A it is
punished. The higher pA the more likely an agent is matched with a group A member
and thus cooperation in group A is more likely to occur. This is true for all treatments
except x = 0 where matching is independent of pA. (iii) and (iv) show that behavior
in the experiment is roughly consistent with attitudes expressed in the questionnaire.
Norm Enforcers (who state that defection should be punished) are more likely to
cooperate. Similarly those that claim to be altruists or conditional cooperators in the
questionnaire did indeed cooperate more in the experiment.
5.4 Proﬁts
The observed behavior (concerning group choice and cooperation) had clear conse-
quences on proﬁts. Recall that overall rates of cooperation were higher, the higher
population viscosity. Consequently, payoﬀs were highest in treatment x = 0, lowest
(and close to the payoﬀs from mutual defection) for x = 1 and in between for the
remaining treatments with intermediate degrees of separation. Members of group A
have a higher payoﬀ than members of group B in treatments x = 0 and x = 1
3 and
vice versa in treatments x =
2
3 and x = 1. We summarize our results in table 5.
25We ran random eﬀect logit regressions for the variable cooperate (= 1 if an agent chooses to
cooperate and zero otherwise). The independent variables were cooperator, dpunish, the treatment
dummies and interaction terms.
13Treatment Group Overall
A B
x = 0 383 223 366
x = 1
3 326 265 303
x = 2
3 206 248 235
x = 1 202 245 229
Table 7: Proﬁts.
We ﬁnd the following regression results.26
Result 3 (Profits)
(i) Average proﬁts in the population are highest in treatment x = 0 (1%), followed by
x = 1
3 (1%) and treatments x = 2
3 and x = 1 (no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
latter).
(ii) The proﬁt of a group A–member is higher than the proﬁt of a group B–member
in treatments x = 0 and x = 1
3 and vice versa in treatments x = 2
3 and x = 1 (all
signiﬁcant at 1%)
Agents that claim to be conditional cooperators in the questionnaire seem to make
somewhat higher proﬁts in all treatments but the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
5.5 Rate of Convergence and Learning Dynamics
How often do the participants switch groups during the experiment? Table 6 reveals
that participants switch most often in the treatments with intermediate degrees of
viscosity, and least often if groups are perfectly separated. While in treatment x = 0
most of the ”group switching” takes place during the ﬁrst quarter (Q1, the ﬁrst 25
rounds) of the experiment, in the treatments with intermediate degrees of viscosity
there is still a substantial number of switches even in the last quarter (Q4). Consis-
tently with theory (either the evolutionary or the reinforcement model) convergence
to equilibrium is fastest in the x = 0 treatment and slowest for the intermediate treat-
ments. The higher payoﬀ diﬀerences between the two groups in the x = 0 and x = 1
treatments eﬀectively seem to speed up learning, as the reinforcement model pre-
dicts. The observed behavior could also reﬂect a higher transparency of the economic
incentives in these two treatments, though.
Result 4 (Convergence) The subjects’ play converges fastest in treatment x = 0
and slowest in treatments x = 1
3 and x = 2
3.
26We ran panel data regressions for the variable totalprofit (that reports overall proﬁts in the
experiment). The independent variables were cooperator, defector, the treatment dummies and
interaction terms.
14Treatment Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Overall
x = 0 48 12 8 3 71
x = 1
3 51 32 39 45 167
x =
2
3 52 38 42 30 162
x = 1 45 25 18 14 102
Table 8: Switching Frequencies per Quarter and Overall, All Treatments.
We feel that estimating and comparing diﬀerent learning models is not of central
interest in this paper. Instead let us take a closer look at what are the factors that
induce agents to switch groups. The candidates we consider are the share of par-
ticipants in either group, the experience of meeting a defector and the experience of
being punished. We get the following results:27
Result 5 (Learning Dynamics)
(i) The share of subjects in group A triggers switches into group A in treatments x = 0
and x = 1
3 and switches into group B in treatments x = 2
3 and x = 1 (all 1%).
(ii) Meeting a defector triggers switches into group A in treatments x = 0 and x =
1
3 and into group B in treatment x = 2
3 (all 1%). There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect in
treatment x = 1.
(iii) The experience of punishment leads to both: switches into group B (since there it
is cheaper to defect) and switches to cooperative behavior in group A (1%).
All of these ﬁndings are consistent with theory.
6 Social Norms in Experiments
Apart from analyzing the eﬀect of population viscosity on cooperation, we also view
this project as a ﬁrst step to tackle the diﬃcult question of experimentally investi-
gating the dynamics of social norms and its relation to the matching structure. As
should have come clear from the previous sections though, there are many diﬃculties
in bringing social norms to the lab. In this experiment we therefore started with an
institutionalized norm. Punishment in group A of course induces material incentives
that resemble incentives of agents adhering to social norms. As a ﬁrst step to gain
insight into normative beliefs we developed the post-experimental questionnaire. If
one wants to truly study the dynamics of social norms in experiments though, a way
27We ran random eﬀects logit regressions for the variable switch (= 1 if an agent had the oppor-
tunity to switch groups and did so). The independent variables were shareA (reporting the share
of participants in group A) pexperience (= 1 if an agent has been punished at least once during the
last 4 periods and zero otherwise) and oppdefectexperience (= 1 if an agent’s match has defected at
least once in the last 4 rounds).
15has to be found to measure social norms in the laboratory. This is a very challenging
question. In Grimm and Mengel (2007) we thus remove the institution and investi-
gate whether norms arise endogenously from the interaction of the agents. As we have
mentioned before investigating social norms is particularly interesting in this context
whenever there are feedback eﬀects between equilibrium and norm. These eﬀects
have been studied theoretically by Benabou and Tirole (2005), Lindbeck, Nyberg and
Weibull (1999), Mengel (2006) and Traxler (2005).
We try to shed some light on these feedback eﬀects through the use of our post
experimental questionnaire, especially designed to gain insight into possible feedback
eﬀects between norm and equilibrium. Our results suggest that such feedback eﬀects
do indeed exist: participants of the x = 0 and x = 1
3 treatments that play cooperative
equilibria more often state (in the questionnaire) that they are in favor of norm-
enforcement than participants of the x = 2
3 and x = 1 treatments do (that have
been playing defective equilibria). This is only very preliminary evidence of such
eﬀects though. It would be desirable to be able to estimate ”norms” directly from the
experimental data instead of relying on questionnaire data only. In a follow up study
we investigate this issue.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have experimentally investigated the impact of population viscosity
on cooperation in social dilemma situations. Participants in our experiment could re-
peatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them an institutionalized norm
fosters cooperation. The degree of population viscosity was varied between treat-
ments. Our results are largely in line with theory. In particular we found that the
share of participants that choose into the norm governed group rises with the degree
of population viscosity. Participants almost always cooperate in the norm governed
group and almost never in the other group. Average proﬁts for participants in the
norm governed group are the higher the more separated groups are. Finally partic-
ipants are able to quickly understand the economic incentives implied by diﬀerent
matching structures (degrees of population viscosity) and their behavior seems con-
sistent with e.g. a simple reinforcement learning model.
Our experiment thus provides evidence on the importance of cultural group selec-
tion for sustaining sanctioning institutions that lead to cooperation. Using a post-
experimental questionnaire we also ﬁnd evidence for possible feedback eﬀects. Par-
ticipants of treatments characterized by high viscosity tend to be more in favor of
norm enforcement. In short, population viscosity seems a powerful and important
mechanism for sustaining cooperation. To understand the way population viscosity
acts on economic incentives and norms gives rich potential for further research, both
theoretically and experimentally.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
First note that whereas in the theory outlined in Section 2 there is a continuum of
agents this is obviously not the case in the experiment. In the following we provide a
proof of the proposition for the discrete case.28 Denote thus the number of agents in
group A (B) by nA (nB) and the total number of agents by n.
Furthermore note that agents in group B will always defect (it is a dominant
strategy to do so in this group independently of the number of subjects in groups
A and B). Assuming that all agents in group A cooperate, the payoﬀ of an agent
in group A from cooperating given that all agents in group A cooperate (denoted















28The proof works analogously for the continuous case.

















n−1x is the probability for an agent from group A to interact with an agent
from group B.29 An agent in group A has incentives to deviate from cooperation and
to defect in group A whenever ΠA(D|C) > ΠA(C|C) or, equivalently, whenever
￿




x(d − b) − (1 − x)(a − (c − γ))














200x an equilibrium where agents in group
A cooperate can exist.
Analogously it can be shown that an equilibrium in which members of group A




150 − (1 − x)200
x
. (4)














































If agents in group A defect their payoﬀ is
ΠB(D|D) = d.
Now we are in the position to prove proposition 1:
29Note that, for the matching probabilities, the number of other subjects in groups A and B matter
(exclusive of the subject under consideration). Thus, in the discrete case, the equivalent to pB in
the matching probability is nB
n−1.
30ΠB(D|C) (ΠB(D|D)) denote the payoﬀ of a group B member if all members of group A cooperate
(defect).
19Case (i) If x < 1
4 agents in group A will always (independently of nA) cooperate as
can be read from (3) and (4). But note that if this is the case and x < 1/4, we have
that ΠA(C|C) > ΠB(D|C) and the dynamic equation implies that
·
pA > 0 ∀pA ∈ [0,1].
All agents will thus end up in group A (n∗
A = n).
Case (ii) Now consider the interval x ∈ [1
4, 4
7]. Note that in this case an equilibrium
where agents in group A cooperate exists only if (3) holds (if there are suﬃciently
many agents in group A), whereas an equilibrium where agents in group A defect
exists if and only if (4) holds. Furthermore, ΠA(C|C) > ΠB(D|C) for high nA and
ΠA(D|D) < ΠB(D|D) ∀nA  = 0. Consequently in this parameter range both equilibria
n∗
A = n and n∗
A = 0 coexist.
Case (iii) Finally consider the interval x > 4
7. Note that in this case ΠA(C|C) <
ΠB(D|C) ∀nA and ΠA(D|D) < ΠB(D|D) ∀nA  = 0. Consequently, independently of
whether agents in group A cooperate or defect (and independently of how many they
are) agents in group B will always receive a higher payoﬀ than agents in group A and
thus,
·
pA < 0 ∀pA ∈ [0,1]. Group B will proliferate. The unique equilibrium will have
n∗
A = 0.
B Instructions Treatment x = 0
Welcome and Thanks for participating at this experiment. Please read these instruc-
tions carefully. They are identical for all the participants with whom you will interact
during this experiment.
If you have any questions please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will
come to you and answer your questions. From now on communication with other
participants is forbidden. If you do not conform to these rules we are sorry to have
to exclude you from the experiment. Please do also switch oﬀ your mobile phone at
this moment.
For your participation you will receive 2,50 Euro. During the experiment you
can earn more. How much depends on your behavior and the behavior of the other
participants. During the experiment we will use ECU (Experimental Currency Units)
and at the end we will pay you in Euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro =
2500 ECU. All your decisions will be treated conﬁdentially.
The Experiment
At the beginning of the experiment we will split you and the other participants
equally into two groups - group A and group B. In each round of the experiment
you play a game against a ”representative member” either from group A or group B
that we will call in the following your interaction partner.
To begin you will play at least 4 rounds as a member of the group that you have
been assigned to at the beginning of the experiment. In each of these 4 rounds you
play a game, that we will describe in the next section.
20Starting with round 5 each round has two phases:
- phase 1: Each round some participants can decide whether to change groups or
not. You can make this decision for the ﬁrst time between round 5 and 8 and from
then on every 4 rounds.
- phase 2: You play the game that we will describe in the next section.
The Experiment consists of 100 rounds.
The Game and the payments
Independently from which group (A or B) you are in, you play during the ﬁrst 4
rounds and in the second phase of every following round the following game with a
randomly selected interaction partner:
In each round you and your interaction partner can choose between two alternative,
C and D. How much you earn in each round depends on what you and your
interaction partner have chosen and in which group you are.
In the payment table below your actions and the payments are given in red and
those of your interaction partner in blue. The table reads as follows:
- if both choose D, each gets 200 ECU (down right)
- if you choose D and your interaction partner C, you get 550 ECU and your
interaction partner 50 ECU (down left)
- if you choose C and your interaction partner D, you get 50 ECU and your
interaction partner 550 ECU (up right)
- if both choose C, each gets 400 ECU (up left)












How does my group-membership impact my payment ?
Group membership impacts payments as follows:
- if you are in group B, you always get the payments described in the table above.
- if you are in groupA, you also get the payments described in the table above.
In the case though that you chose action D and your interaction partner in this
round is also from group A, 200 ECU will be deducted from your payments.
In addition your group membership impacts with which other participants you
interact in the experiment. How exactly we will explain in the following section.
Who do I play with and how does this depend on my group-membership
?
In each round your interaction partner will be chosen randomly. You will interact
exclusively with participants of the experiment, that in the round in question are in
the same group (A or B) as you are. In other words, you always only interact with
members of your own group. Obviously the composition of the groups can change
21during the course of the experiment as both you and the other members can change
their group-membership in ﬁxed intervals.
In each round, before the second phase, we will give you information about your
group-membership and about which share of participants is currently in group A and
B.
Your interaction partner
Your interaction partner in each round is not another participant of the experi-
ment, but a ”representative member” of the group in which you are at the moment.
He chooses the actions C and D with probabilities that correspond to the shares with
which the other members of your group have chosen C and D.
If you are the only member of your group, the behavior of your interaction partner
will be simulated by the computer (but only in this case). In all other cases the
behavior of your interaction partner depends exclusively on the behavior of the
other members of your group.
These rules obviously are the same for all other participants of the experiment.
Example: You are in group A and consequently your interaction partner will also
be from group A.
- if among the other members in group A 70% chose action C and 30% chose
action D, your interaction partner will choose with probability 70% action C and
with probability 30% action D.
-if all other members of group A have chosen action C, your interaction partner
will choose action C with probability 100%.
Information you receive
In each round you get the following information
At the beginning of the second phase you are informed
- in which group you are
- what share of agents is in group A and B respectively.
After the second phase you are informed about
- which action you and your random interaction partner have chosen
- your payment.
22